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I. Introduction
The twentieth century was the bloodiest in history and,
paradoxically, the most technologically advanced.1  The
international conflicts, barbarity, and systematic abuses of
fundamental human rights that took place in this century fly in the
I As Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald wrote:
The twentieth century is best described as one of split personality: aspiration
and actuality. The reality is that this century has been the bloodiest period in
history. As improvements in communications and weapons technology have
increased, the frequency and barbarity of systematic abuses of fundamental
rights have likewise escalated, yet little has been done to address such abuses.
Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, The Eleventh Annual Waldemar A. Sof Lecture: The
Changing Nature of the Laws of War, 156 MR. L. REv. 30, 32 (1998). Judge Kirk
McDonald is the President of the International Criminal Tribunal for Crimes in the
Former Yugoslavia located in The Hague. See id.
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face of the more than fifty-four international courts and tribunals
that were contemporaneously created to foster and maintain
international peace and justice.3
Even in this unprecedented era of judicial expansion and
protection of human rights, hate remains pervasive. 4  It is
undiminished by logic or reason and undeterred by laws
specifically adopted to restrain humankind's pursuit of
sovereignty, liberty, and nationalism through armed conflict A
number of nations and individuals have resorted to force in order
2 See Cesare P. R. Romano, The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies:
The Pieces of the Puzzle, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 709, 709 (1999).
1 This is evidenced in U.N. reports from the International Tribunal for the
Prosecutions of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991:
The belief that lasting peace can be better secured through justice than through
revenge or forgetting was recognized by the Security Council when it created
the Tribunal. It established this judicial organ because the atrocities being
committed in the former Yugoslavia constituted a threat to international peace
and security and in the conviction that the Tribunal's establishment would
enable an end to be put to such crimes and would contribute to the restoration
and maintenance of peace.
Fourth Annual Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, U.N. GAOR, 52d Sess., Agenda Item
49, U.N. Doc. A/52375-S/19971729 (1997) (visited Mar. 31, 2000)
<http://www.un.org/icty/rapportan/rapport4-e.htm> [hereinafter Fourth Annual Report of
the ICTY].
4 See Andrew Sullivan, What's So Bad About Hate: An Unsentimental Reflection
on Schoolyard Shootings, Matthew Shepard, Genocide and the Easy Consensus on Hate
Crimes, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Sept. 26, 1999, at 52 (noting that "hate is everywhere,"
including the United States where hate crimes increased exponentially between 1985 and
1999).
I The United Nations Charter was adopted in 1945 "to save succeeding
generations from the scourge of war... to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in
the dignity and worth of the human person... to ensure, by the acceptance of principles
and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common
interest." U.N. CHARTER, Preamble. Ironically, discriminatory and racist laws based on
the specious theory of eugenics and the superiority of one race over another were enacted
in Germany in the 1930s and in Vichy, France in 1940. These laws actually condoned
discrimination against Jews and minorities and were a prelude to the genocide that
annihilated 6,000,000 Jews. See RICHARD H.WEISBERG, VICHY LAW AND THE
HOLOCAUST IN FRANCE (1996); see also Richard H. Weisberg, Vichy Law and the
Holocaust in France: Precis of a Talk to the Hofstra Conference in LAW & THE ARTS 81
(Susan Tiefenbrun, ed., 1999).
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to reach such legitimate goals as self-determination and identity
while others pursue with equal passion the goals of globalism,
interdependence, and integration.6
The coexistence of reason and passion is a paradox that is
expressed in the power of the law that exists alongside undeniable
acts of atrocity committed worldwide. Six million Jews were
exterminated in World War II. A half of a million Armenians were
interned and killed between 1915 and 1921 in a genocide about
which few even know. More recently, one million people were
savagely annihilated in Rwanda in the course of 100 days while the
world watched and chose not to intervene.
How can one explain the atrocities that have taken place in the
face of numerous international ad hoc and administrative tribunals
established to deter violations of humanitarian law and to keep
peace through justice? The Nuremberg Tribunals showed that if
perpetrators of horrific crimes remain unpunished, victims will
seek revenge.7 Despite the teachings of Nuremburg, a culture of
impunity prevails today where more than thirty-one indicted war
criminals remain at large in the Republika Srpska and in the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.! These two nations continuously
refuse to extradite indictees to The Hague in accordance with their
Dayton Accords obligations,9 even though such indictees are
6 See generally Thomas M. Franck, Clan and Superclan: Loyalty, Identity and
Community in Law and Practice, 90 AM. J. INT'LL. 359, 382 (1996).
For some the growing internationalism of recent years has provoked anomie,
xenophoebia, a white-knuckled clinging to the flotsam and jetsam of identity
that floats to the surface whenever a ship of state founders. . . . With the
crumbling of the empires and the emergence of immature democracy, ancient
blood feuds and tribal hatreds have been unleashed by unscrupulous politicians
to aggrandize themselves.
Id.
7 See The Honorable Louise Arbour, History and Future of the International
Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REv.
1495, 1503 (1998). "If there can be no peace without justice, then I believe there can be
no real peacekeeping without law enforcement for war crimes." Id.
8 See Fourth Annual Report of the ICTY, supra note 3, at 132-136.
9 See id Unlike the International Criminal Trubunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) has been benefiting
from the cooperation of neighborly states. However, recently the ICTR decided to drop
its case against a former official in Rwanda accused of helping to organize the 1994
genocide. See Christopher S. Wren, U.N. Tribunal Wrong to Free Top Suspect, Rwanda
Says, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1999, at AlO. This decision angered the Rwandan
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guaranteed fair and impartial trials at the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991 (ICTY).' ° The
lingering presence of unpunished war criminals in Yugoslavia,
some of whom perform important duties"1 or hold high office,12 is
evidence of a culture of impunity that acts as a thorn in the side of
the victims of war atrocities. It has been said that "[n]othing
encourages crime more than impunity.""
Early in the history of Rwanda, German and Belgian
colonizers fueled the flames of prejudice and rivalry between the
native Hutus and Tutsis." In the post-colonial era, the Rwandans
themselves perpetuated prejudicial practices and adopted
discriminatory policies that fed the hatred between Hutus and
Government that has decided "to suspend cooperation on other cases ... a move that
could bring new prosecution to a halt." Id.
10 The ICTY was created in May 1993 by Security Council Resolution 827, to
which is annexed the Statute of the ICTY. SC Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48' Sess., 3217"
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.3217 (1993) [approving the Report of the Secretary-General
pursuant to paragraph 2. of S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48" Sess., U.N. Doc. S/25704
and ADD.1 (1993), reprinted in 32 ILM 1203 (1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute].
11 "In the last year [1998], the number of indictees taken into custody in The Hague
has more than tripled, from eight to twenty-eight. Many of those indicted for genocide
who were at large a year ago are no longer at large. We recognize that our work is not
finished, and that much more needs to be accomplished. We share the impatience and
frustration arising from the fact that some of the major indictees, including Radovan
Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, remain at large." The Honorable David J. Scheffer,
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Address Before the
Conference on War Crimes Tribunals: The Records and Prospects, in 13 AM. U. INT'L
L. REv. 1383, 1390 (1998).
12 Biljana Plavsic has never been indicted. She is currently the President of the
Republic of Srpska, a professor of biology, the political leader of the Bosnian Serbs, the
successor of Radovan Karadzic, and an important initiator and proponent of the
discriminatory policy of ethnic cleansing. Biljana Plavsic is quoted as saying that ethnic
cleansing is a natural phenomenon, not a war crime. See Jonathan Tiefenbrun, Doctors
and War Crimes: Understanding Genocide, in WAR CRIMES AND WAR CRIMES
TRIBUNALS PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 127 (Leon Friedman and Susan Tiefenbrun,
eds., 1999) [hereinafter FRIEDMAN & TIEFENBRUN].
13 Lucas W. Andrews, Comment, Sailing Around the Flat Earth: The International
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia as a Failure of Jurisprudential Theory, 11 EMORY
INT'L L. REv. 471, 482 (1997).
14 See PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT TOMORROW WE WILL
BE KILLED WITH OUR FAMILIES: STORIES FROM RWANDA 54-62 (1998).
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Tutsis."5 In the spring and early summer of 1994, "a program of
massacres decimated the Republic of Rwanda.' ' 6 "It was the most
efficient mass killing since the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki."'17 This genocide, which reportedly resulted in the death
of 800,000 people, occurred entirely inside Rwanda and was
dubbed an "internal conflict."' 8
Immediately following the massacres, the Rwandan
Government advocated the establishment of an international
tribunal that would eradicate "the culture of impunity" that
characterized Rwandan society. 9 However, the government's pro-
international adjudication attitude was short-lived. Ultimately the
Rwandan Government rejected the establishment of the ad hoc
tribunal on numerous grounds." The Rwandan Government's
reversal of its initial support for international adjudication is not
unlike the U.S. reversal of support for the establishment of a
permanent International Criminal Court (ICC).2' Such policy
15 See id at 54; Paul J. Magnarella, Some Milestones and Achievements at the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: The 1998 Kambanda and Akayesu Cases,
11 FLA. J. INT'L L. 517, 518-520 (1997) (summarizing the history of discrimination and
hatred that existed in Rwanda and that contributed to the causes of the genocide); see
also Robert F. Van Lierop, Report on the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,
in FRIEDMAN & TIEFENBRUN, supra note 12, at 203, 207-208.
16 GOUREVITCH, supra note 14, at 4.
'7 Id.
18 See id.
1 Payam Akhavan, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: The Politics
and Pragmatics of Punishment, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 501, 504 (1996).
20 See infra notes 90-115 and accompanying text (discussing the Rwandan
Government's reasons for initially advocating and then finally rejecting the
establishment of an international tribunal for the adjudication of crimes committed in
Rwanda in 1994). See also Ian Fisher, Crisis Points Up Tough Choices for Tribunal on
Rwanda, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1999, at 3 (noting that the conflict between the Rwandan
Government and the ICTR still continues today and was most recently manifested in the
government's refusal to cooperate with the ICTR because of the tribunal's controversial
dismissal of a top genocide suspect held in pre-trial detention for an extremely long
period of time).
21 See generally Steven Lee Myers, Kosovo Inquiry Confirms U.S. Fears of War
Crimes Court, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2000, at A6 (reporting that ICTY officials "completed
an internal report in late December [1999] that was a legal analysis of the possibility that
NATO allies had committed war crimes during their 78-day campaign against
Yugoslavia"). The United States' fear of how an international criminal court would act
with regard to American soldiers was recently justified in the attempt to implicate the
United States in the NATO bombings over Kosovo. See id.
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reversals demonstrate the embedded paradox examined in this
article.
Despite opposition from the Rwandan Government, the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was
established in Arusha, Tanzania in 1994.22 The ICTR got off to a
slow start, however, due to governmental corruption, inefficiency,
ill will, and general opposition to its existence. Nevertheless, the
ICTR has made every effort to meet its charge of establishing
peace with justice in Rwanda by eradicating impunity. The fact
remains that Rwanda is now and has been at peace since the
establishment of the ICTR.
Although we live in an age of unprecedented rationality and
scientific progress, we cannot explain the ubiquitous hatred, the
proliferation of internal conflicts, and the escalation of wars into
genocides. We yearn for world peace; yet national and
international criminal courts offer only punishment and retribution
in response to inhumane violence.23  These courts are, however,
properly guided by rational justice rather than by revenge.
This article considers the achievements of certain international
tribunals as they seek to foster and maintain peace. Part II
examines recent trends in the establishment of international
tribunals, identifies the major international tribunals, and considers
the role they play in eradicating a culture of impunity.24 Part II
also examines recent changes in the international judiciary, which
reflect changes in society, and discusses the advantages and
disadvantages of international adjudication.25 Part III focuses on
the procedural and substantive accomplishments of the ICTY.26
Parts III and IV discuss the role that the ICTY played in
investigating violations of humanitarian law in Kosovo and the
frustrations the tribunal experienced due to a lack of state
22 S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49h Sess., 3453" mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994)
(Nov. 8, 1994) (with annexed Statute), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1600 (1994) [hereinafter
the ICTR Statute].
23 See Todd Howland & William Calathes, The U.N.'s International Criminal
Tribunal, Is it Justice or Jingoism for Rwanda? A Call for Transformation, 39 VA. J.
INT'L L. 135 (1998) (discussing the goals of deterrence, retribution, incapacitation,
restoration, and rehabilitation in the criminal justice system in Rwanda).
24 See infra notes 32-52 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 53-115 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 116-208 and accompanying text.
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cooperation. Part IV also examines the role of the ICTY in
adjudicating major cases and maintaining peace in Yugoslavia in
the future.28 Parts V and VI examine the accomplishments and
shortcomings of the ICTR.29 After examining both the ICTY's and
ICTR's accomplishments, these sections conclude that the
international tribunals have positively affected efforts to foster and
maintain lasting peace with justice. Part VII looks at the role
played by the newly energized International Court of Justice (the
World Court) in fostering peace among states.3°  Part VIII
examines the contribution of the international ad hoc tribunals-
the ICTY and the ICTR-as setting the stage for the establishment
of a permanent International Criminal Court.31 Such a court might
serve to deter ethnic hatred and tribal feuds that can result in
ethnic cleansing, genocide, and other war crimes common to the
twentieth century.
II. Recent Trends in the Establishment of International
Tribunals
In order to assess recent trends in international adjudication,
this section first examines the nomenclature of the tribunals and
their two major classifications. It then examines the post-war
reformations of more than a dozen international tribunals.33 To
better determine the actual contributions of these tribunals, the
section discusses the advantages of international criminal court
adjudications over national court adjudications.34 Given the
obvious advantages of the uniformity of standards made possible
by an international criminal tribunal, this section then inquires into
the bases of objections to the establishment of an ad hoc
international criminal court and demonstrates that many, if not
most, of those objections are unjustified. 5
27 See infra notes 118-41, 209-18 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 209-18 and accompanying text.
29 See infra notes 219-60 and accompanying text.
30 See infra notes 261-78 and accompanying text.
31 See infra notes 279-89 and accompanying text.
32 See infra notes 36-52 and accompanying text.
33 See infra notes 53-70 and accompanying text.
31 See infra notes 71-89 and accompanying text.
35 See infra notes 90-115 and accompanying text.
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A. Classification of the International Judiciary
The international judiciary has recently been classified 6 into
two main groups-international judicial bodies and quasi-judicial
dispute settlement or implementation control bodies. International
judicial bodies include: courts of general jurisdiction;3" courts of
the law of the sea;38 international criminal law/humanitarian law
courts;" environmental courts;4° courts of trade, commerce and
investments; 41 courts of human rights; 2 and courts established to
carry out regional economic integration agreements in Europe,
43
Africa,"4 the Middle East/Arab Countries,45 and Latin America.46
Quasi-judicial dispute resolution or implementation control bodies
36 See Romano, supra note 2.
37 Courts of General Jurisdiction currently in existence include the International
Court of Justice (known as the World Court, located in the Peace Palace in The Hague,
and established by the United Nations in 1946) and The Central American Court of
Justice "Corte Centroamericana de Justicia" (established in 1991). See U.N. CHARTER,
arts. 7.1, 36.3, 92-96; see also 34 I.L.M. 923.
38 The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea was established in 1982. See
UNCLOS art. 287, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/121 (1982), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261
(1982).
39 The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia was established
in 1993 by Resolution 827 of the United Nations Security Council. See ICTY Statute,
supra note 10. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda was created by Security
Council Resolution 955 in November 1994. See ICTR Statute, supra note 22.
40 The International Court for the Environment is now extinct. See Romano, supra
note 2, at 724.
41 In 1995 the World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Understanding
created the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, an ad hoc organ, and the Appellate Body, a
permanent organ. The WTO Dispute Settlement Body is a permanent arbitral tribunal
and resolves major international trade disputes. See id. at 719.
42 The European Court of Human Rights was created in 1959. The Inter-American
Court of Human Rights was established in 1979.
13 E.g., the Court of Justice of the European Communities (1952); the Court of First
Instance of the European Communities (1988); the EFI'A Court (1944); and the Benelux
Economic Union Court of Justice (1974).
44 E.g., the Court of Justice of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern
Africa (1998), and the Common Court of Justice and Arbitration of the Organization for
the Harmonization of Corporate Law in Africa (1997).
41 E.g., the Court of Justice of the Arab Maghreb Union (1989) and the Judicial
Board of OAPEC (1980).
46 E.g., the Court of Justice of the Andean Community (1984).
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include: international administrative tribunals; 7  inspection
panels; 48  human rights bodies;49  non-compliance bodies; °
permanent arbitral tribunals and conciliation commissions;" and
international claims and compensation bodies. 2 Human rights
adjudicative bodies constitute the largest number of international
tribunals with implementation controls.
B. Changes in the International Judiciary and Society
Since the post-Cold War period, the international community
47 E.g., the United Nations Administrative Tribunal (1949); the International Labor
Organization Administrative Tribunal (1946); the World Bank Administrative Tribunal
(1980); the Inter-American Development Bank Administrative Tribunal (1981); the
Administrative Tribunal of the Organization of American States (1976); the Appeals
Board of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (1950); the
Council of Europe Appeals Board (1965); the Appeals Board of NATO (1965); the
Appeals Board of the European Space Agency (1975); the Appeals Board of the
Intergovernmental Committee (1972); and the Appeals Board of the Western European
Union (1956).
48 E.g., the World Bank Inspection Panel (1994); the Inter-American Development
Bank Independent Investigation Mechanism (1995); and the Asian Development Bank
Inspection Policy (1995).
49 The largest number of international judicial tribunals classified as quasi-judicial
bodies having implementation control consists of "Human Rights Bodies." They
include: the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (1946); the International
Civil and Political Rights Committee (1976); the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (1987); the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
(1969); the Committee against Torture (1987); the Committee on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1981); the Committee on the Rights of the
Child (1990); the African Commission on Human and People's Rights (1987); the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights (1979); the Committee of Independent Experts
under the European Social Charter (1998); the ILO Committee of Experts on the
Application of Conventions and Recommendations (1926); the ILO Conference
Committee on the Application of Conventions (1926); the ILO Commission of Inquiry
(1919); the ILO Governing Body Committee on Freedom of Association (1950).
50 E.g., the Implementation Committee under the Montreal Protocol on Substances
that Deplete the Ozone Layer (1970).
51 E.g., the Permanent Court of Arbitration (1899); the OSCE Court on
Conciliation and Arbitration (1964); the OAU Commission of Mediation, Conciliation
and Arbitration (1964); the International Center for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes (1966); the NAFTA Dispute Settlement Panels (1994); the North American
Commission on Environmental Cooperation (1993); the International Joint Commission
(1909).
52 E.g., the Iran-USA Claims Tribunal (1980) and the United Nations
Compensation Commission (1990).
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has extensively reformed nearly one dozen international
tribunals." For example, more and more international tribunals
are granting standing to non-state entities.54  In the past, the in
personam jurisdiction of most international tribunals was limited
to disputes between sovereign states." The jurisdictional
expansion of international tribunals to non-state entities has given
rise to the development of international criminal adjudication.56
The dazzling array of newly-created and reformed international
tribunals in the twentieth century is testament to the unprecedented
expansion of the international judiciary and the development of
serious interest in the commitment to the protection of human
rights.57
Law is a reflection of society. The proliferation of
international tribunals in the late twentieth century was a response
to increasing ethnic hostility and massive destruction that required
more widespread and effective dispute resolution mechanisms to
keep peace and protect human rights. The more recently created
international tribunals such as the ICTY and the ICTR are
specifically designed to maintain peace through justice.58 Both
tribunals have mandates to keep and disseminate accurate historic
records59 of the crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia and in
13 See Romano, supra note 2, at 709-10.
54 See id at 710, 739.
55 See id. at 710.
56 See id at 709-10.
57 See Implications of the Proliferation of International Adjudicatory Bodies for
Dispute Resolution, PROCEEDINGS OF AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
FORUM, CO-SPONSORED WITH THE GRADUATE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (L.
Boisson de Chazournes ed., 1995).
58 See Romano, supra note 2, at 718.
59 See Fifth Annual Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of
Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, U.N. GAOR, 531
Sess., Agenda item 48, 91 297, 299, U.N. Doc. A/53/219-S/19981737 (1998) (visited
Mar. 31, 2000) <http://www.un.org/icty rapportan/rapport5-e.htm> [hereinafter Fifth
Annual Report of the ICTY].
Yet, it is not enough simply to create a record. Its power lies in its
dissemination, most crucially within the former Yugoslavia .... In hearing the
victims' testimonies, it ensures that the ear of history, which has so often been
deaf this century, is listening. To those who made them victims, its proceedings
demonstrate why justice is better than revenge. Responding within a framework
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the territory of Rwanda.60  The ICTY seeks to punish the
perpetrators of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of
19496 and thereby deter future violations of the laws or customs of
war, genocide,63 and crimes against humanity.64 The ICTR seeks
to punish perpetrators of genocide and crimes against humanity,
and violators of Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and
Additional Protocol II. The latter relate to crimes committed in
internal conflicts and those were perpetrated specifically in the
territory of Rwanda.65 The subject matter jurisdiction of the ICTR,
however, does not include war crimes or grave breaches of the
Geneva Conventions-both of which require a connection with an
international conflict as distinct from the internal conflict in
of law to an attack on the human being, and not within a framework of violence
and destruction, is the first step in rebuilding a community from the ruins of a
society divided by ethnically-based slaughter.
Id.
60 See id.
61 See ICTY Statute, supra note 10, art. 2. Grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions are not provided in the Statute of the ICTR because the crimes perpetrated
in Rwanda were committed during an internal rather than an international conflict. Even
though grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 require a connection with an
international conflict, it is "by now a settled rule of customary international law that
crimes against humanity do not require a connection to international armed conflict."
Theodor Meron, War Crimes Law Comes of Age, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 462, 464 (1998)
(quoting Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-1-AR72, Appeal on Jurisdiction, 141 (Oct. 2,
1995), reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 32 (1996)).
62 See ICTY Statute, supra note 10, art. 3. In comparing the ICTY and ICTR
Statutes, it is important to note that violations of the laws of customs of war are not
provided for per se in the ICTR. See Akhavan, supra note 19, at 503-4. These are
covered instead under Violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of
Additional Protocol H in Article 4 of the Statute of the ICTR. See ICTR Statute, supra
note 22, art. 4.
63 See ICTY Statute, supra note 11, art. 4. Note that Article 4 of the ICTY Statute
defines "genocide" to include the "conspiracy to commit genocide"; "direct and public
incitement to commit genocide"; "attempt to commit genocide"; "complicity in
genocide"; but it does not include "rape" or "sexual violence." Id. Rape is included in
"crimes against humanity" in both the ICTY Statute and the ICTR Statute. See id. art. 5;
ICTR Statute, supra note 22, art. 3. Genocide is covered in Article 2 of the ICTR
Statute. Id. art. 2.
64 See ICTY Statute, supra note 10, art. 5. "Crimes against humanity [include]
murder; extermination; enslavement; deportation; imprisonment; torture; rape;
persecutions on political, racial, and religious grounds; [and] other inhumane acts." Il
65 See ICTR Statute, supra note 22.
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Rwanda.66
The territorial and temporal jurisdictions of both ad hoc
tribunals are limited.67 Their jurisdiction is concurrent with that of
national courts that were created to prosecute persons having
committed serious violations of international humanitarian law in
the territories of Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia.6  Although
their jurisdiction is concurrent, the ad hoc tribunals have primacy
over the national courts.69 Because of the temporal jurisdictional
limits of these courts, they will both disappear once the
perpetrators are tried and convicted.70  Therefore, serious crimes
that occurred outside of Yugoslavia and Rwanda, before 1991 or
after 1994, respectively, may go unpunished unless: (1) new ad
hoc tribunals are established to deal with such crimes; or (2) the
proposed permanent international criminal court with expanded
jurisdictional reach is actually established. The proposed
International Criminal Court would be a stable, permanent tribunal
for the adjudication of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
genocide, which may arguably not be adequately adjudicated in
national courts.
C. Advantages of International Criminal Court Adjudication
Over National Court Adjudication
If competent and effective national courts exist ' to adjudicate
66 See Akhavan, supra note 19, at 503.
67 See ICTR Statute, supra note 22, art. 1. Article 7 of the Statute of the ICTR
provides that the territorial and temporal jurisdiction of the Court is limited in time to the
period beginning on 1 January 1994 and ending on 31 December 1994 and limited in
space to the territory of Rwanda and the territory of its neighboring states for serious
violations of international humanitarian law committed by Rwandan citizens. See id.
art. 7. Article 8 of the Statute of the ICTY provides that the territorial and temporal
jurisdiction of the ICTY is limited in time to the period beginning on 1 January 1991 and
in space to the territory of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. ICTY
Statute, supra note 10, art. 8.
68 See ICTY Statute, supra note 10, art. 9(1); ICTR Statute, supra note 22, art. 8(1).
69 See ICTY Statute, supra note 10, art. 9(2); ICTR Statute, supra note 22, art. 8(2).
70 See ICTY Statute, supra note 10, art. 8; ICTR Statute, supra note 22, art. 7.
71 "In the field of international humanitarian law, some of the most horrendous
crimes have been committed with impunity because of shortcomings in the domestic
criminal justice systems. However, since Nuremberg the domestic criminal law
environment has changed very dramatically." Louise Arbour, The Status of the
International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda: Goals and
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war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, what is the
purpose of international courts? Regarding the establishment of
an ad hoc tribunal for crimes committed in Rwanda, the Rwandan
Government outlined four good reasons for its establishment.72
But almost as soon as the government expressed enthusiastic
support for the international tribunal, it promptly refused to vote
for it on bases that have since proven unfounded."
The first reason to adjudicate genocide and crimes against
humanity in an international court rather than in a domestic court
is to account for the universality of these crimes.74 The Rwandan
Government initially favored the establishment of an international
tribunal because "the genocide committed in Rwanda is a crime
against humankind and should be suppressed by the international
community as a whole.""
A second reason for favoring international over domestic
adjudication is to dispel any suspicions of vengeful justice on the
part of a national court.76 The Rwandan Government initially
believed that locating a tribunal in a place geographically distant
from where the crimes were committed would ensure impartiality
and justice.77 There are serious disadvantages to creating distance
between the locus of the crimes committed and the tribunal
adjudicating these crimes, however.7" For example, distance is an
impediment to the effective dissemination of the court's historic
record of events to victims.79 The important achievements of the
court located in Arusha, which has fairly and impartially sentenced
Results, in FRIEDMAN & TIEFENBRUN, supra note 12, at 37; see also Fritz Weinschenk,
"The Murderers Among Them"-German Justice and the Nazis, in FRIEDMAN &
TIEFENBRUN, supra note 12, at 137 (discussing the general failure of the German courts
to adjudicate the grand majority of war criminals at large in Germany).
72 See Akhavan, supra note 19, at 504-05.
73 See id at 508.
74 See id. at 504.
15 The Situation Concerning Rwanda: Establishment of an International Tribunal
for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Violations of International Humanitarian
Law in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Such Violations
Committed in the Territory of Neighboring States, U.N. SCOR, 49" Sess., 3453d mtg.,
at 14, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3453 (1994) [hereinafter Rwandan Statement to the U.N.].
76 See id.
77 See Akhavan, supra note 19, at 504.
78 See id. at 508.
71 See id.
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high-level convicted criminals, remain relatively unknown to the
public in Rwanda due to an inefficient outreach program and poor
communications. 0
A third reason to adjudicate in an international court is to
avoid the culture of impunity that may exist in certain nations. In
the atmosphere of impunity that exists in Rwanda, it would be
very difficult to build respect for the rule of law among the
Rwandan people and to arrive at a true national reconciliation via
the domestic court system alone." When victims are denied
justice, they may commit acts of vengeance that can escalate into
war.83  The failure to prosecute perpetrators may prevent the
reconstruction and reconciliation of society because the criminals
"retain their power and influence, preventing the return of refugees
and the reinstitution of a pluralistic society.84
A fourth reason for establishing an international tribunal is to
facilitate prosecution of criminals who may have escaped during
the war and found refuge in foreign countries. 5 This reason is
more applicable to the ICTY than to the ICTR because for the first
four years of the ICTY's existence foreign states refused to
extradite indictees suspected of playing major roles in the
16Yugoslavian war crimes.
A final reason to prosecute war criminals in an international
tribunal is to remove the onus of guilt from the nation as a whole
and to place it on the individual criminal.87 The failure to attach
responsibility to the individuals who perpetrate these crimes may
result in the stigmatization of entire societies.88 Stigmatization can
8o See id.
81 See id. at 504-05.
82 See id.
83 See generally McDonald, supra note 1, at 33 n.4 (discussing the assassinations in
the 1920s of several individuals allegedly responsible for atrocities committed by the
government of Turkey against the Armenians).
94 Id. at 34.
85 See Akhavan, supra note 19, at 505.
86 See Fifth Annual Report of the ICTY, supra note 59, 1 223.
87 See Howland & Calathes, supra note 23, at 157.
88 See generally STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS ATROcrIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 4-23 (1997) (discussing the
development and purpose of the international law trend of focusing criminal liability on
the individual).
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lead to renewed conflicts, which have occurred in Rwanda,
Burundi, the former Yugoslavia, and more recently in Kosovo,
where wars have been ascribed to unpunished crimes related to
historical ethnic hatreds.89 Ascribing guilt to an entire society
simply fuels the fires of prejudice, which is the root of the
committed atrocities.
D. Objections to the Establishment of an Ad Hoc
International Criminal Court
Despite the good reasons offered by the Rwandan Government
for establishing the ICTR to adjudicate crimes committed in
Rwanda in 1994, the Rwandan Government ultimately voted
against its establishment for at least the following seven reasons.
First, the Rwandan Government was concerned that the
jurisdiction of the ICTR was limited and temporal, covering only
crimes committed in 1994.90 In light of Rwandan history, the
Rwandan Government considered this time period to be too
restrictive.9 ' Its objection reflects the fact that for many years prior
to 1994, harsh discrimination, forced carrying of identity cards,92
and other forms of prejudice against Hutus existed in Rwanda.
The long-term practice of discrimination against the Hutus and the
favoritism enjoyed by the elite Tutsis were the underlying causes
of a widespread and systematic attack by Hutus, who intended to
exterminate the civilian population of Tutsis.93 This extermination
ultimately took place in the course of less than one year.
94
Second, the Rwandan Government objected to the composition
and structure of the tribunal, which they viewed as "inappropriate
and ineffective" to guarantee speedy trials.95 Justice delayed is
89 See McDonald, supra note 1, at 33-34.
90 See Rwandan Statement to the U.N., supra note 75, at 14.
91 See id
92 See id "Decades of discrimination-by custom of patrilineal descent and by
laws, such as that requiring cards that identified each person by the ethnie, or ethnic
group, of Hutu or Tutsi-had led the Tutsi to be regarded as a distinct, stable, permanent
group." Diane Marie Amann, International Decisions: Prosecutor v. Akayesu Case
ICTR-96-4-T. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, September 2, 1998, 13 AM. J.
INT'LL. 195, 196 (1999).
93 See id. at 195-96.
94 See Akhavan, supra note 19, at 505.
95 See Rwandan Statement to the U.N., supra note 75, at 15.
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justice denied, they argued.96 The Rwandan Government sought a
greater number of trial chamber judges.97 It also recommended
that the tribunal be given its own Appeals Chamber and
prosecutor, so it would not have to share such resources with the
ICTY.98 The sharing of the prosecutor between the two tribunals,
located far from each other, was designed to insure a link between
them that would further facilitate "a unity of legal approach, as
well as economy and efficiency of resources." 99 Notwithstanding
these laudable goals, the deplorable conditions of pre-trial
detention in Arusha are undeniable, and the speediness of ICTR
trials would be facilitated by an increase in the number of judges,
as provided for in Resolution 955.' 00
Third, the Rwandan Government claimed that the meager
budget of the tribunal would lead to the prosecution of only minor
crimes, like plunder or corporal punishment, which could be
adequately handled by internal, national tribunals.'0 ' Furthermore,
the government feared that the tribunal's lack of funds would
cripple efforts to prosecute the perpetrators of genocide."2 This
objection proved to be unwarranted. For example, the Akayesu
and Kambanda trials in the ICTR represent milestones in
international humanitarian law.'0 3 Jean Kambanda is the first
person in history to accept personal responsibility for genocide
before an international court, and Jean-Paul Akayesu is the first
defendant to have been found guilty of genocide and sentenced by
an international tribunal' °4 Both defendants were major players in
the war. In addition, the Akayesu trial represents "the first time an
international tribunal has conceptualized acts of sexual violence,
including rape, as genocide."'0 5
96 See id.
97 See id
98 See id.
99 Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 5 of Security Council
Resolution 955 (1994), U.N. Doc. S/1995/134, at 3, 1 9.
100 See ICTR Statute, supra note 22.
101 See Rwandan Statement to the U.N., supra note 75, at 15.
102 See id
103 See Magnarella, supra note 15, at 518.
'o See id.
1o5 Id.
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Fourth, the Rwandan Government also questioned the
impartiality of certain judicial candidates. l°6  However, the
selection criteria for the judges mandated by the statute largely
dispel this concern. The trial and appellate chambers of the ICTR
must consist of "persons of high moral character, impartiality and
integrity who possess the qualifications required in their respective
countries for appointment to the highest judicial offices."1 7
Fifth, the Rwandan Government vigorously objected to the
imprisonment of Rwandan criminals outside of Rwanda in remote,
comfortable prisons in Norway and other countries which would
have the authority to decide issues pertaining to Rwandan
detainees.' 8  The Rwandan Government claimed that these
decisions should be made by the ICTR or by the Rwandan people
themselves. 1°9  Despite protections against such fears, duly
provided for in Article 27 of the Yugoslav Statute10° and Article 26
of the Rwanda Statute,"' respectively, there is no doubt that
detaining and imprisoning suspects and criminals in foreign places
vitiates the deterrent effects of adjudication and undermines the
goal of a lasting peace through justice.
Sixth, the Rwandan Government also objected to the
sentencing disparity between national and international courts."2
Since the ICTR does not permit capital punishment and the
Rwandan Penal Code does, genocide perpetrators and persons in
positions of leadership appearing before the ICTR might simply be
sentenced to jail, whereas lower-level criminals appearing before
the national Rwandan courts could be "subjected to the harshness
of the death sentence.""' 3 Arguably, Rwandans could perceive this
sentencing disparity as yet another example of discrimination,
which could aggravate the festering hatred that contributed to the
initial genocide.
Finally, the Rwandan Government objected to the location of
106 See Rwandan Statement to the U.N., supra note 75, at 15.
107 ICTR Statute, supra note 22, art.12(1).
108 See Rwandan Statement to the U.N., supra note 75, at 15.
109 See id.
"o See ICTY Statute, supra note 10.
"' See ICTR Statute, supra note 22.
112 See Rwandan Statement to the U.N., supra note 75, at 16.
113 Id.
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the Rwandan Tribunal in Arusha, Tanzania.' 14 The same objection
has been raised with respect to the seat of the ICTY in The
Hague-far removed from the locus of the crimes committed in
former Yugoslavia.' 5 In Rwanda and Yugoslavia, media coverage
of distant tribunal adjudications remains sparse and often
inaccurate. Consequently, the effectiveness of such adjudications
as an aid in fostering the eradication of a culture of impunity and
in promoting reconciliation has been greatly reduced.
IM. The Accomplishments of the ICTY in Fulfilling its Aim
to Foster Peace with Justice
In order to assess the accomplishments of the ICTY, this
article examines its procedural and substantive contributions to the
development of international criminal law by discussing such
seminal decisions as Prosecutor v. Tadic"6 and Prosecutor v.
Erdemovic.'1 7
A. Procedural Accomplishments of the ICTY
The United Nations Security Council's establishment of the ad
hoc tribunal for the former Yugoslavia was of paramount
significance on the institutional plane."1 8 However, the ICTY was
slow to begin fulfilling its lofty goal of maintaining peace through
justice in the former Yugoslavia. Initially, states refused to
extradite the major Yugoslavian war indictees, and the ICTY
earned a short-lived but justifiable reputation for prosecuting only
the "small fish.""' 9 The ICTY is no longer lacking defendants to
try, as states are beginning to cooperate with the tribunal in the
adjudication process. For example, Croatia has arranged for the
114 See id.
"I See Arbour, supra note 71, in FRIEDMAN & TIEFENBRUN, supra note 12, at 45.
"[T]he ICTY sits in The Hague with respect to crimes committed in the former
Yugoslavia. The ICTR sits in Arusha, Tanzania, for crimes committed in Rwanda. In
view of the location of the Tribunals we have to be able to bring criminal justice
locally." Id.
116 See Opinion and Judgment, Case No. IT-94-1-T (May 7, 1997).
117 See Sentencing Judgment, Case No. IT-96-22-T (Nov. 29, 1996).
118 See Meron, supra note 61, at 462.
119 See RATNER AND ABRAMS, supra note 88, at 187 (quoting interview with
Mohamed Sacirbey, Bosnian Ambassador to the U.N., Charlie Rose (PBS television
broadcast, May 9, 1996)).
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surrender to the ICTY of a number of indicted Croatian nationals
and Bosnian Croats.12 0 Nevertheless, most of the indicted Bosnian
Serbs have yet to be arrested, and the principal leaders responsible
for many atrocities are still at large or in hiding.1 2' This suggests
that the culture of impunity in the former Yugoslavia remains
largely intact.
The ICTY has, however, significantly refined its procedural
structure both internally and externally. It has improved its
operations, developed Rules of Procedure and Evidence, and
interpreted and expanded international law through its decisions.
When the ICTY first began in 1993, it had neither a physical nor a
legal infrastructure.2 2 The tribunal had no means of investigating
alleged crimes, no courtroom, no rules of evidence or procedure,
no strategies to reach and protect witnesses, no jails to incarcerate
sentenced criminals, and little funding to correct these ills.2 3
States harboring indictees were slow to extradite, or failed to
extradite at all, creating a serious impediment to the adjudication
of serious crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia.'
2 4
Moreover there was a general lack of political will for the ICTY to
succeed in 1993. Some even claimed that prosecutions were
detrimental to the peace process.1
25
Over the past five years,'26 the ICTY has changed from an
inchoate institution lacking a basic structure, staff, resources, and
defendants to a fully functioning tribunal that is pursuing twenty-
six public indictments against ninety-three indictees.'27 Twenty-
seven indictees are currently in custody, awaiting trial or serving
120 See Meron, supra note 61, at 462.
121 See id. at 463.
122 See Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, The International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia: Making a Difference or Making Excuses? Speech to the Counsel
on Foreign Relations (May 13, 1999) (last modified Aug. 11, 1999) <http://www.pict-
pcti.org/news/archive/May/ICTY.05.13.crimninal.html>.
123 See id.
124 See id.
125 See id
126 Annual reports provide comprehensive assessments of the procedural
accomplishments of the court. See Fourth Annual Report of the ICTY, supra note 4;
Fifth Annual Report of the ICTY, supra note 59.
127 See ICTY Key Figures, (last modified Mar. 30, 2000)
<http://www.un.org/icty/glance/keyfig.htm>.
570 [Vol. 25
2000] THE PARADOX OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 571
sentences; ten have been convicted; two have pleaded guilty; two
were acquitted; and two indictees died in custody, one from
natural causes and the other from suicide.
28
The ICTY holds trials and appellate proceedings on a regular
basis. Between July 28, 1998 and July 31, 1999, the tribunal
completed three full trials and one appeal.1 29 As of the latter date,
four trials were in progress, one trial awaited judgment, and seven
trials and four appeals were pending.
30
The staff at the tribunal has increased dramatically over the
last several years. The number of staff has grown from 197 in
1996 to 368 in 1997,"3 to 511 in 1998, 32 and to 791 in 1999.'1
3
The budget of the tribunal has surpassed $96 million.134  The
tribunal now boasts four courtrooms, three trial and one
appellate,1 3' and extensive support facilities, including a detention
unit, security service, court support personnel and workspace, and
interpretation services.1 36 The tribunal has basic office equipment,
a state of the art courtroom, Rules of Procedure and Evidence,
Rules of Detention and Related Regulations, a Directive on the
Assignment of Defense Counsel, a Directive on Registry, and a
Code of Conduct.' 37 Three more judges were added in October
1998 3
The increased activity of the ICTY is evident from the number
of days the ICTY judges sit in court, which has grown from 3 in
128 See Fact Sheet on ICTY Proceedings (last modified Mar. 30, 2000)
<http://www.un.org/icty/glance/fact.htm>.
129 See Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, 54" Sess., Prov. Agenda Item 53, Annex
I, U.N.Doc. A/54/187, S/1998/846, U 16, 73 [hereinafter Sixth Annual Report of the
ICTY].
130 See id.
131 See Fourth Annual Report of the ICTY, supra note 3, 106.
132 See Fifth Annual Report of the ICTY, supra note'59, 1 72.
133 See Sixth Annual Report of the ICTY, supra note 129, 1 175.
134 See id. [ 172.
135 See id 2.
136 See id. E 162, 154, 156, and 176.
131 See Fourth Annual Report of the ICTY, supra note 3, art. 173.
131 See Sixth Annual Report of the ICTY, supra note 129, 2.
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1994 to 176 in 1997.'9 Furthermore,
in addition to some three hundred procedural decisions
interpreting [the ICTY's] rules ... [it has] codified procedures
on a range of practical matters, such as a legal aid system, a
code of conduct for counsel, the maintenance of a purpose-built
detention unit ... the rights of [detainees], and counseling and
support for victim witnesses, for whom the act of testifying is
often terribly traumatic.
4 0
The growth of the tribunal led one observer to remark, "the ICTY
is coming of age as a credible forum for the international
prosecution of war crimes within its jurisdiction.'.'. The
procedural accomplishments of the ICTY will help lay the
groundwork for the permanent International Criminal Court.
B. Substantive Accomplishments of the ICTY: The Tadic
Case1
42
The ICTY has made significant contributions to the expansion
and interpretation of international humanitarian law. 43 The
decisions of the ICTY reflect the development of customary law
and its acceptance by states that are now ready to prosecute
offenders under a principle of universal jurisdiction.'"
1. The Significance of the Tadic Case and the Expansion
of the Definition of Crimes of Humanity to Internal
Conflicts and Peacetime Incidents
The seminal Tadic case stands for the proposition that crimes
against humanity do not require a connection to international
armed conflict. 45  Moreover the tribunal's Appeals Chamber
139 See Sean D. Murphy, Developments in International Criminal Law: Progress
and Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 93
AM. J. INT'L L. 57, 60 n.7 (1999) (citing The Tribunal in Action, ICTY BULL., No. 20-
I-1998, at 17).
140 See McDonald, supra note 1, at 36.
141 Id. at 57.
142 Prosecutor v. Tadic, UN Doc. IT-94-1-T (ICTY May 7, 1997),full text available
at www.un.org/icty/tadic/trialc2/jugement-e/tad-tj970507e.htm; Prosecutor v. Tadic,
U.N. Doc. IT-94-1-AR72 (ICTY Oct. 2, 1995).
143 See Murphy, supra note 139, at 95-96.
144 See Meron, supra note 61, at 464.
145 See Tadic, U.N. Doc. IT-94-1-AR72, 141.
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provided:
It is by now a settled rule of customary international law that
crimes against humanity do not require a connection to
international armed conflict. Indeed, as the Prosecutor points
out, customary international law may not require a connection
between crimes against humanity and any conflict at all. Thus,
by requiring that crimes against humanity be committed in either
internal or international armed conflict, the Security Council
may have defined the crime in Article 5 [of the ICTY statute]
more narrowly than necessary under customary international
law. There is no question, however, that the definition of crimes
against humanity adopted by the Security Council in Article 5
comports with the principle of nullem crimen sine lege.46
Nevertheless, the Appeals Chamber concluded that an armed
conflict was a necessary predicate to jurisdiction. 147 Undoubtedly,
the redefinition of crimes against humanity to include internal
conflicts reflects the increase in internal rather than international
conflicts in the second half of the twentieth century.
The Tadic judgment reaffirmed that a "single act by a
perpetrator taken within the context of a widespread or systematic
attack against a civilian population entails individual criminal
responsibility, and an individual perpetrator need not commit
numerous offences to be held liable.' 4'  Although crimes against
humanity can only be committed against civilian populations, the
Tadic court construed the term "civilian population" broadly:
49
"[T]he presence of those actively involved in the conflict should
not prevent the characterization of a population as civilian and
those actively involved in a resistance movement can qualify as
victims of crimes against humanity."'50 Evidence that "acts occur
on a widespread or systematic basis that demonstrates a policy to
commit those acts, whether formalized or not" is sufficient to meet
the definition of crimes against humanity.' More importantly,
Tadic held that a policy to commit crimes against humanity need
146 Id.
147 See id 142; Tadic, UN Doc. IT-94-1-T, 560.
148 Tadic, UN Doc. IT-94-1-T, 649.
149 See id n[ 635-44.
150 Id. 1643.
IS Id. 1653.
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not be a state policy. 5 2
After World War II, crimes against humanity, as crimes of a
collective nature, could be committed only by states or by
individuals exercising state power. The Tadic court recognized,
however, that "the law in relation to crimes against humanity has
developed to take into account forces which, although not those of
the legitimate government, have de facto control over, or are able
to move freely within, defined territory."'53  The definition
includes terrorist groups or organizations.'54 The court also held,
in a departure from customary law, that all crimes against
humanity require discriminatory intent.'
2. The Tadic Case and the Definition of Rape as a Crime
Against Humanity, as a Grave Breach of the Geneva
Convention, and as a War Crime
Rapes were frequently carried out as means of 'ethnic
cleansing' during the conflict in the former Yugoslavia.'56
[T]he ICTY Statute specifically lists rape as a crime against
humanity when committed in armed conflict and directed against
a civilian population. It is difficult ... to prove that one such
assault is part of an orchestrated plan to carry out mass rapes,
which has left the prosecutor typically charging rape as either a
grave breach [of the Geneva Convention] or a violation of the
laws and customs of war. The ICTY Statute does not expressly
mention rape as a grave breach or other war crime; nor do the
1949 Geneva Conventions list rape as a 'grave breach.'
Nevertheless, the definition of 'grave breach' (which includes
torture, inhumane treatment, and the infliction of great suffering
or serious injury to body or health) clearly encompasses rape ....
[S]pecial evidentiary rules have been developed to address cases
involving sexual assault.
152 See id. 655.
153 Id. 1654.
154 See id.
155 See id. U[ 650-52.
156 See Murphy, supra note 139, at 88.
157 Id. (citing Colloquy, No Justice, No Peace: Accountability for Rape and Gender-
Based Violence in the Former Yugoslavia, 5 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 89 (1994)); see
also ICTY Statute, supra note 10, art. 5; Beth Stephens, Humaitarian Law and Gender
Violence: An End to Centuries of Neglect? in FRIEDMAN & TIEFENBRUN, supra note 12,
at 87.
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3. The Tadic Case and Sexual Violence
Rape is, arguably, already a crime under international law.5
Sexual violence should be similarly regarded. "[S]exual violence
under international humanitarian law is as normal as rape is in
war."1 59 The United Nations provided a legal framework for the
investigation and prosecution of sexual violence through the ICTY
and the ICTR: the ICTY Statute includes rape as a crime against
humanity,'6 and the ICTR Statute includes rape both as a crime
against humanity and as a Protocol II crime."' The Legal Advisor
for Gender-Related Crimes to the Office of the Prosecutor of the
ICTY and the ICTR observed that while "[m]any people view [the
Tadic decision] ... as something of a failure in terms of sexual
violence ... I believe [it] will be a forerunner of the richness of
sexual assault jurisprudence."1 62
The Tadic case involved one of the most horrifying examples
of sexual violence imaginable. Thirty witnesses testified to the
treatment they had received at the hands of their captors, including
Tadic 63 One of these witnesses, Witness H, testified that he
was ordered to lick [Fikret Harambasic's] naked bottom and G
[another detainee] to suck his penis and then to bite his testicles.
Meanwhile a group of men in uniform stood around the
inspection pit watching and shouting to bite harder. All three
were then made to get out of the pit onto the hangar floor and
Witness H was threatened with a knife that both his eyes would
be cut out if he did not hold Fikret Harambasic's mouth closed
to prevent him from screaming; G was then made to lie between
the naked Fikret Harambasic's legs and, while the latter
struggled, hit and bite his genitals. G then bit off one of Fikret
Harambasic's testicles and spat it out and was told he was free to
leave. Witness H was ordered to drag Fikret Harambasic to a
158 See Theodor Meron, Rape as a Crime Under International Humanitarian Law,
87 AM. J. INT'L L. 424, 427 (1993) (citing Letter from Robert A. Bradtke, Acting
Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, to Sen. Arlen Specter
(Jan. 27, 1993)).
159 Patricia Viseur-Sellers, Emerging Jurisprudence on Crimes of Sexual Violence,
13 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1523 (1998).
160 See ICTY Statute, supra note 10, art. 5.
161 See ICTR Statute, supra note 22, arts. 3, 4.
162 Viseur-Sellers, supra note 159, at 1528.
163 See Prosecutor v. Tadic, UN Doc. IT-94-1-T (ICTY May 7, 1997), full text
available at <www.un.orglicty/tadicltrialc2/jugement-e/tad-tj970507e.htm>.
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nearby table, where he then stood beside him and was then
ordered to return to his room, which he did. Fikret Harambasic
has not been seen or heard of since.' 64
No one could identify Tadic as being present at this assault.
65
Witnesses did, however, identify Tadic as being present during
beatings that occurred immediately prior to the torture of
Harambasic.'66
The court considered the culpability of Tadic for his acts under
Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute addressing direct criminal
responsibility. 67 The court reasoned that in order to attach
individual responsibility to the defendant, it must first determine
whether Tadic's conduct, which the prosecution had proven
beyond a reasonable doubt, sufficiently connected him to the
crime. 68 The court looked to the Nuremberg Mauthausen
decision 69 as precedent for this question. 70 The court stated that:
when an accused is present and participates in the beating of one
person and remains with the group when it moves on to beat
another person, his presence would have an encouraging effect,
even if he does not physically take part in this second beating,
and he should be viewed as participating in this second beating
as well.'
Since "the accused in some instances was himself the perpetrator
and in others intentionally assisted directly and substantially in the
common purpose of inflicting physical suffering upon [the
victims] and thereby aided and abetted in the commission of the
crimes,"'' 7 the court found him guilty of crimes against humanity
for inhumane acts under Article 3173 and violations of the law and
customs of war for cruel treatment arising from the Harambasic
164 Id. 1206.
165 See id. [228.
166 See id 9 213-23.
167 See id. In 661-62.
168 See id. 673.
i69 See Mauthausen Concentration Camp Trial (Trial of Hans Alfuldisch and Six
Others), Vol. XI Law Reports 15.
170 See Tadic, UN Doc. IT-94-1-T, 676, 683.
17 Id. 1690.
172 Id. 730.
173 See id. 726.
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incident. 7' Tadic's conviction for sexual assault under
international law as the result of his encouragement of the act,
absent any other active role, is significant.17
4. The Tadic Case and the Application of Grave Breaches
to Internal Conflicts as well as International Conflicts
The Tadic interlocutory appeal decision in 1995 confirmed the
applicability of some principles of customary law to non-
international armed conflicts, notably those set forth in The 1907
Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War
and annexed Regulations.7 6 Dispute arose in the Tadic case over
whether or not grave breaches of the Geneva Convention, which
normally require a nexus with an international armed conflict, and
which are usually inapplicable to internal conflicts, could be found
on the facts of the Tadic case. 177 The Prosecutor initially succeeded
in convincing the trial chamber that its jurisdiction over grave
breaches of the Geneva Convention was not contingent upon a
showing of international armed conflict.' On interlocutory
appeal, however, the appellate chamber of the ICTY held that
Article 2 of the ICTY Statute relating to grave breaches of the
Geneva Convention applies only to offenses committed during an
international armed conflict. 79
' See id. 730.
175 In Akayesu, the ICTR further expanded the adjudication of sexual violence under
the rubric of genocide. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T (Sept. 2, 1998)
(visited Nov. 18, 1998) <http://www.ictr.org/english/judgements/akayesu.html>. Another
case decided by the ICTR, Kayishema, also examined the role that sexual violence
played in causing death. Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-7-
T (May 21, 1999). A third case decided by the ICTY, Furundzija, considered the
criminal responsibility of a commander charged with conducting an interrogation while
the victim was being raped. Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/F, 38 (1998)
(visited Nov. 15, 1999) <http:llwww.con.orglICTY/furundzijaltrialc2/judgmentl
main.html>. These cases, along with Tadic, constitute the ICTY's and the ICTR's
contributions to the arsenal of sexual violence jurisprudence clarifying and enhancing the
protection afforded the international community.
176 Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague, IV),
Oct. 18, 1907, 1 Bevans 631, 633.
1"I See Prosecutor v. Tadic, U.N. Doc. IT-94-1-AR72, 1 557-87 (ICTY Oct. 2,
1995).
178 See id, 7[588, 607-8.
179 See id, " 77, 80-82.
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The distinction between armed international conflicts and
armed intervention in internal conflicts is a contentious one-
typical of the choices that the world faces in this era of
humanitarian emergencies. 80  The distinction poses a choice
between humanitarian intervention in internal conflicts and the
protection of self-determination and state sovereignty. The U.N.
Charter allows states to use armed force against other states only
in two situations: when required or permitted by a resolution of the
Security Council pursuant to Article 42,' or when acting in self-
defense, pursuant to Article 51.82
Protection of state-sovereignty and territorial integrity are the
overriding principles limiting armed intervention to international
rather than internal conflicts."3 These principles are being eroded
by customary law114  and a counter-movement towards
humanitarian intervention'85 and the protection of human rights.
To intervene without Security Council sanction, as NATO did in
Kosovo, is a violation of international law. Nevertheless, the
Secretary General of the United Nations admitted that "shameful
inaction," like the failure to intervene in Rwanda, only invites
"future Rwandas and Kosovos."' 186  The movement away from
non-intervention and toward human rights protection is manifested
by recent political incidents. Examples of such action include the
180 David Rieff, Wars Without End?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1999, at A29.
181 See U.N. CHARTER art. 42.
182 See id. art. 51.
183 Aaron Schwabach, The Legality of the NATO Bombing Operation in the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, 11 PACE INT'L L. J. 405 (1999); Aaron Schwabach, Yugoslavia
v. NATO, Security Council Resolution 1244, and the Law of Humanitarian Intervention,
27 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 77 (1999).
184 See Editorial, Kofi Annan's Critique, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1999, at A29. Kofi
Annan criticized the NATO bombing of Kosovo but recognized that such regional
approaches that lack U.N. endorsement are "bound to continue as long as the Security
Council cannot unite. He stopped short of recommending reform of the Security
Council's veto powers or its composition which still reflects the balance of world power
after World War II." Id.
185 Christopher S. Wren, Raise Intervention Abilities, Clinton Urges U.N. Members,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1999, at A18: "I know that some are troubled that the United
States and others cannot respond to every humanitarian catastrophe in the world,"
President Clinton said. Id. "We cannot do everything everywhere. But simply because
we have different interests in different parts of the world does not mean we can be
indifferent to the destruction of innocents in any part of the world." Id
"I Rieff, supra note 180, at A29.
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U.N. intervention in Kosovo, which was clearly not legally
authorized under the U.N. Charter, and the intervention in East
Timor,"7 which was sanctioned by the Security Council and verbal
pronouncements by U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan,"8 ' who
now claims to support U.N. intervention in internal conflicts.89
Similarly, the United Nations Security Council voted recently to
send peacekeeping forces to Sierra Leone, whose deplorable
record on human rights violations calls for humanitarian
intervention.'9" Moreover, the United Nations may establish a
peacekeeping operation in Congo in the near future. Thus, the
tendency in the post-Cold War world is to advocate humanitarian
intervention in internal conflicts even if this intervention means
infringing on traditional protections of state sovereignty.
By broadening the definition of crimes against humanity to
include internal conflicts as well as international conflicts, the
187 See Barbara Crossette, Annan Warns Indonesians that Inaction May Lead to
Criminal Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1999, at A6: "The Secretary General said he
had been stunned by 'thousands of messages' reaching his office accusing the United
Nations of abandoning the East Timorese. 'Let me assure you most emphatically that
this is not the case,' he said." Id.
188 See Kofi Annan's Critique, supra note 184, at A26: "Secretary General Kofi
Annan made U.N. intervention the subject of a provocative opening speech on Monday.
It should focus attention on a growing consensus that the world cannot simply watch
mass slaughter when effective action is possible to prevent or stop future Kosovos and
East Timors." Id.
189 See Stanley Hoffman, Principles in the Balkans, But Not in East Timor? N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 11, 1999, at A25: "In East Timor, where rampaging militias supported by
elements of the Indonesian army are terrorizing the population, there's no conflict
between the fundamental principles of human rights and a nation's self-determination.
Indonesia is an illegal occupier of East Timor, not a legal sovereign .... What this crisis
points to once again is the need for regional organizations . . . to take over in
emergencies like this one and put together a common force .. " Id.
190 Barbara Crossette, 6,000 U.N. Peacekeepers to be Sent to Sierra Leone, N.Y.
TIMES, October 23, 1999, at A4.
In Sierra Leone, rebels who fought the Government of President Ahmad Tejan
Kabbah have been responsible for brutal acts of violence. The rebels chopped
off the hands or legs of thousands of civilians, including many children, as
warnings or punishment. Thousands of others have died, and a half a million
people were driven from their homes.
Id. Amnesty was given to two competing rebel leaders in order to reach a peace
agreement in Sierra Leone, but Richard C. Holbrooke said, "Like the Secretary General,
we are concerned by the provisions for amnesty. We remain committed to justice and
accountability." Id.
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Tadic court seemed at first to be moving in the same direction as
international customary law, a direction which is clearly required
in view of the changes regarding the way wars are waged. The
Tadic lower court tended toward protecting human rights when it
decided to expand the definition of grave breaches of the Geneva
Convention to include internal conflicts as well as international
conflicts. '91 However, by refusing to apply grave breaches to
internal conflicts, the Tadic appellate decision marks a set back in
the steady legal tide toward the application of a broader range of
war crimes to internal conflicts.' 92 In her dissent from the decision
on the Tadic Interlocutory Appeal, Judge Gabrielle Kirk
McDonald noted that "a State-sovereignty-oriented approach has
gradually been supplanted by a human-being oriented
approach."'1 93 She concluded that, given the nature of current wars,
the distinction between "international" and "internal" conflicts,
which is critical in the application of many important international
treaties to current conflicts and which characterizes international
humanitarian law, is untenable at the end of the twentieth
century.' 94 It is interesting to note that in contrast to Tadic, the
ICTY trial chamber found that there was an international armed
conflict in Bosnia through 19929' in Prosecutor v. Mucic and
Landzo (Celebici Camp).'96
Thus, the Statute for ICTY affirms, and the Tadic case
reaffirms, that crimes against humanity do not require a nexus
with international wars. Both the ICTY and the ICTR criminalize
rape as a crime against humanity.'97 One of the most important
contributions of the ICTY is to clarify and expand the definition of
crimes against humanity as it did in the Tadic decision. 98
191 See Prosecutor v. Tadic, UN Doc. IT-94-1-T, 568 (ICTY May 7, 1997), full
text available at <www.un.org/icty/tadic/trialc2/jugement-e/tad-tj970507e.htm>.
192 See Prosecutor v. Tadic, U.N. Doc. IT-94-1-AR72, 1 77, 80-82 (ICTY Oct. 2,
1995).
193 Id. 1 72,73.
194 McDonald, supra note 1, at 24-35.
195 Murphy, supra note 139, at 68.
196 See Prosecutor v. Mucic and Landzo, Case No. IT-96-21-T, I1 233-34 (1998),
<http://www.un.org/icty/celebici/trialc2/j ugement/main.htm>.
197 See ICTY Statute, supra note 10, art. 5; ICTR Statute, supra note 22, arts. 3,4.
198 See Prosecutor v. Tadic, UN Doc. IT-94-1-T, 91 28-40 (ICTY May 7, 1997), full
text available at <www.un.org/icty/tadic/trialc2/jugement-e/tad-tj970507e.htm>.
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C. Substantive Accomplishments of the ICTY: The
Significance of the Erdemovic Case99 and the Defense of
Duress and Superior Orders
The ICTY has made a significant contribution to the
elucidation of some general principles of criminal law, particularly
duress and superior orders. 00 The holding in Prosecutor v.
Erdemovic further clarifies the concept of command responsibility.
Erdemovic participated in the execution of approximately 1200
unarmed civilian men in a town in eastern Bosnia.20 ' He claimed
that he had an obligation to obey the orders of his military
superior.2  He asserted that he acted under physical and moral
duress, out of fear for his life and for that of his family.23 He
testified that if he had refused to obey the orders, he was told that
he would have been killed along with the victims. 2°4 The majority,
however, found that duress was not a complete defense "to a
soldier charged with crimes against humanity or war crimes in
international law involving the taking of innocent lives.
' 205
In short, the work of the ICTY has demonstrated that
international investigation and prosecution of persons responsible
for serious violations of international humanitarian law are
possible and credible. 6 Apart from its substantive and procedural
legal accomplishments, the ICTY has also had a significant impact
on its international relations with states and with certain
international organizations like NATO.207  The tribunal depends
heavily on NATO for the extradition of indictees and for the
199 Appeals Judgment, Case No. IT-96-22-A, (1997).
200 See id. 19.
201 See id 110.
202 See id 8.
203 See id
204 See id
205 See Prosecutor v. Tadic, UN Doc. IT-94-1-T, 91 588, 697-8 (ICTY May 7, 1997)
(McDonald, J., and Vohran, J., Joint Separate Opinion).
206 See Theodor Meron et al., War Crimes Tribunals: The Record and the
Prospects: The Contribution of the Ad Hoc Tribunals to International Humanitarian
Law, 13 AM. U. INT'LL. REv. 1509,1512 (1998).
207 See Laura Palmer & Christina Posa, Recent Development, The Best-Laid Plans:
Implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords in the Courtroom and on the Ground, 12
HARv. HuM. RTS. J. 361, 377 (1999).
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execution of warrants of arrests.2 8 NATO's cooperation is
essential to the successful functioning of the tribunal.
IV. Shortcomings of the ICTY
After examining the accomplishments of the ICTY, one should
realize its shortcomings. The failure to prosecute major war
criminals because host nations are not willing to extradite the
suspects is but one deficiency. The sentencing of "small fish"
rather than principal perpetrators resulted in the failure of the
ICTY to quell the unrest in the Balkans, which led to the tragic
war in Kosovo.
A. Failure to Extradite Major Perpetrators
Despite the tribunal's obvious successes, the majority of the
arrest warrants issued by the ICTY have been completely
ignored.2 9  Twenty-nine publicly indicted persons remain at
liberty, 2 0 most in the Republika Srpska and others in the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia. Both of these Republics in Yugoslavia
refuse to cooperate with the ICTY, and they continue to show
disregard for their Dayton Accords obligations."' Certain states
continue to ignore their legal obligation to pass domestic laws to
conform to the obligations of the tribunal under Security Council
Resolution 827.12 Nevertheless, due to the presence, performance,
and power of the ICTY, individuals suspected of international
humanitarian violations do face the real possibility of trial and
conviction.
B. Failure to Maintain Peace
Recent events in Kosovo suggest that the ICTY has not
maintained international peace and security in the territory of the
former Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, to attribute that tragedy to the
failure of the tribunal as an institution is to disregard the non-
208 See id.
209 See United Nations, Fact Sheet, International Criminal Court for the Former
Yougoslavia (visited April 3, 2000) <http://www.un.org/icty/glance/fact.html>.
210 See id
211 See Palmer & Posa, supra note 207, at 368-71.
212 See Claudio Grossman et al., International Support for International Criminal
Tribunals and an International Criminal Court, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1413, 1432
(1998).
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cooperation, noncompliance, and complacency that characterizes
the culture of impunity in Yugoslavia and constitutes a cause of
the Kosovo conflict. In Yugoslavia and in Bosnia and
Herzegovina the continuing presence of many of the individuals
who are charged with the responsibility for the conflict have
hampered the post-war recovery. NATO began detaining
indictees in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1997; and it continues to
do so.2"3 Now there is widespread acceptance of the tribunal's
existence and recognition of its role in the peace process.
The dual role of the Prosecutor of the ICTY is to investigate
violations of humanitarian law in the territory of the former
Yugoslavia and to prosecute those violations.1 4 Prosecutor Louise
Arbour recruited a team of investigators to look into the crimes
allegedly committed in Kosovo. Pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 1160 (1968) of 31 March 1998, Prosecutor Arbour went
to Kosovo but was denied entry."5 The government of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia has flagrantly and continuously ignored
the ICTY despite its obligation under the Dayton Accords to
cooperate with requests, orders, and arrests. The President of the
ICTY wrote to the Security Council four times and appeared
before it twice urging immediate action to address Kosovo's non-
compliance. The Prosecutor and the President of the ICTY wrote
to NATO and to the Peace Implementation Council urging them to
oversee the Dayton Accords and to alert the international
community in an effort to seek legal means to deter the onslaught
of war and to stop the atrocities occurring in Kosovo. 6
The ICTY lacks a legislative forum and a media outreach
program to boost its public relations capacity in The Hague and in
the former Yugoslavia.Such institutions would provide adequate
means of transmitting, interpreting and implementing the results of
the criminal proceedings for the public. As a result of insufficient
media coverage and outreach programs, the tribunal currently
suffers from anti-tribunal propaganda. The ICTY is portrayed as
biased, slow, and inefficient. In the Republic of Yugoslavia the
213 See Palmer & Posa, supra note 207, at 378-79.
214 See Fifth Annual Report of the ICTY, supra note 59, 111.
2I See Charles Trueheart, A New Kind of Justice, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Apr.
2000, at 81-82.
216 See Fifth Annual Report of the ICTY, supra note 59, 118.
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Serbs claim the tribunal is bent on subjugating them.
In order for the ICTY to reach its goals of maintaining
international peace and security, more states must assist the
tribunal in bringing indictees to justice and in insuring that the rule
of international humanitarian law prevails domestically.
Therefore, the ICTY must work with national courts to prosecute
the perpetrators, as was done at Nuremberg.217 Non-cooperation,
noncompliance and complacency only erode the tribunal's efforts
to maintain peace through justice rather than by revenge."'
V. The Accomplishments of the ICTR in Fulfilling its
Aims to Foster Peace with Justice
In order to assess the accomplishments of the ICTR, this paper
examines its substantive and procedural contributions to the
development of international law which were made possible by
two important decisions: the Prosecutor v. Kambanda case and
the Akayesu case." 9
The ICTR has made significant progress in the prosecution of
individuals responsible for the 1994 genocide of Tutsis and
moderate Hutus in the territory of Rwanda. The Akayesu
judgment is of particular historic significance because it defined
rape in international law.22° Rape may constitute genocide under
Akayesu.22 '
The tribunal in Arusha has enjoyed recent success partially
because it has received cooperation from various countries.
Countries have assisted by: arresting accused persons; providing
facilities for the incarceration of convicted persons; facilitating
transfers of witnesses from their territories to the tribunal; and
voluntarily donating financial and other material assistance.
22
Certain countries such as Australia, Austria, Belgium, Norway,
217 See iL 295.
211 See id. 1294.
219 Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR 97-23-S (Sept. 4, 1998) (visited Nov.
18, 1998) <http://www.ictr.org/english/judgements/kambanda.html>; Prosecutor v.
Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T (Sept. 2, 1998) (visited Nov. 18, 1998)
<http://www.ictr.org/english/judgements/akayesu.html>.
220 See Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, § 7.8, 215.
221 See id,
222 See Press Release from Arusha on March 9, 1999 <http://www.pict-
pcti.org/news/archive/March/ICTRCooperationO3.09.html>.
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Sweden, Trinidad and Tobago, and the United States have adopted
domestic laws to facilitate their cooperation with the ICTR
223
When the President of Rwanda, Juvenal Habyarimana, was
assassinated, which some believe to have been engineered by
hard-line Hutus, violence erupted in Rwanda and resulted in the
rape and mass murder of 800,000 people, mostly Tutsis. In
addition to this massacre, the tragedy involved the forced
deportation of two million people from within Rwanda's borders,
and the exodus of over two million Hutus to Zaire, Burundi,
Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda. The rate of slaughter of Rwandan
victims was three to four times that of the number of Jews killed in
the Holocaust. 5
The ICTR was established to harness international cooperation
in order to strengthen the Rwandan national judiciary, which faced
the daunting task of trying large numbers of Rwandan suspects. 6
Currently, the ICTR has indicted thirty-five individuals, and
twenty-three individuals are in custody, including many of the top
officials and principal organizers of the genocide.227
The ICTR judgments in Akayesu and Kambanda have made
significant contributions to the establishment of a valuable
historical record of events that took place in Rwanda in 1994.
Both cases contribute to the expansion of international
humanitarian law.
A. The Kambanda Case:228 Personal Responsibility for
Genocide
The case against Rwandan ex-premier Jean Kambanda arose
out of the tragic events that took place over a period of 100 days in
1994 during which the unspeakable slaughter of 800,000 Tutsis
223 See id.
224 Neil J. Kritz et al, War Crimes Tribunals: The Record and the Prospects: The
Rwanda Tribunal and its Relationship to National Trials in Rwanda, 13 AM. U. INT'L L.
REV. 1469, 1470 (1998).
225 See id.
226 See id. at 471.
227 See id
228 Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR 97-23-S (Sept. 4, 1998) (visited Nov.
18, 1998).<http://www.ictr.org/english/judgements/kambanda.html>.
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occurred in Rwanda.229 The ex-premier Kambanda pled guilty to
all counts against him and thereby accepted personal responsibility
for the genocide his nation committed.230
Genocide is a specific intent crime, as defined in the 1948
Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide23' and in the Statute of the ICTR.232 To secure a
genocide conviction, a prosecutor must prove that one of the acts
233listed under Article 2(2) of the ICTR Statute, such as killing,
causing serious bodily or mental harm, was committed against a
targeted national, ethical, racial or religious group with the intent
to destroy the group "in whole or in part. ' ' 11 4 Kambanda admitted
that the annihilation of the Tutsis as a group was an intentional
policy of his government.235  His confession, which evidenced his
government's intentional policy of genocide, will be the basis of
future ICTR prosecutions.
B. The Akayesu Case:236 Rape and Sexual Violence Defined
as Genocide and War Crimes
The former Taba bourgmestre-or Mayor-Jean-Paul
Akayesu is the first person to have been found guilty of genocide
after a trial by an international tribunal. In addition, the Akayesu
trial represents the first time an international tribunal has
conceptualized sexual violence, including rape, as an act of
genocide. In both the Statute of the ICTR 237 and the Statute of the
ICTY,238 rape may constitute an element of a crime against
humanity. Rape is not included in the definition of genocide in
229 See id. U P 39(i)-(xi).
230 See id. U 5-7. Counts against him included genocide and crimes against
humanity (murder). See id. 3.
231 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
232 ICTR Statute, supra note 22, art. 2(2).
233 Id.
234 Id. art. 2(2).
235 See Kambanda, Case No. ICTR 97-23-S, T 39(i)-(xi).
236 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T (Sept. 2, 1998) (visited Nov. 18,
1998) <http://www.ictr.org/english/judgements/akayesu.html>.
237 ICTR Statute, supra note 22, art. 3(g).
238 ICTY Statute, supra note 10, art. 56.
586 [Vol. 25
2000] THE PARADOX OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION
either Statutes of the ICTY or ICTR.
Jean-Paul Akayesu, a Rwandan national, was born in 1953.239
He became mayor of Taba commune and remained in that office
until 1994240 when he fled to Zambia. He was arrested in Zambia on
October 10, 1995.241 The final indictment against him contained a
total of fifteen counts charging Akayesu with genocide, complicity
in genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide,
extermination, murder, torture, cruel treatment, rape, other
inhumane acts and outrages upon personal dignity, crimes against
humanity and violations of Article 3 Common to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions and Additional Protocol 11.242
In order to decide whether Akayesu was guilty of genocide,
the court had to determine if genocide actually occurred in
Rwanda. Genocide requires a special intent to destroy-in whole
or in part-a national, ethnic, racial or social group. Therefore, it
was necessary to determine the meanings of these specific
categories, since they were not defined in the Genocide
Convention or in the ICTR Statute.243 The Trial Chamber read the
travaux pr6paratoires of the Genocide Convention and concluded
that the drafters perceived the crime of genocide as targeting only
stable, permanent groups whose membership is determined by
birth.24 The problem with this definition is that the Tutsi-Hutu
distinction in Rwanda does not fit into any of the categories.245
The Tutsis belong to the same religious groups and national group
as the Hutus.246 The Tutsis and Hutus share a common language
and culture.247
The Trial Chamber then asked whether the Tutsis constituted a
stable and permanent group.24  They did constitute a group
referred to as "ethnic" because they were forced to carry identity
239 See Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, § 1.4, 1 7.
240 See id.
241 See id.
242 See id. § 1.2, Counts 1-15.
243 See id. § 3,1 [217-31.
244 See id. § 3,231.
245 See id. § 2, IN143-151.
246 See id. §2,$ 151.
247 See id § 2, V 143-151.
241 See id.
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cards prior to 1994 on which the word "ubwoko," or "ethnic
group," was referenced. 249 The court found that at the time of the
alleged events the Tutsis did constitute a stable and permanent
group.25° The Akayesu court added "stable and permanent groups
whose membership is largely determined by birth" to the four
existing categories (national, ethnic, racial, and religious group)
listed in the Geneva Convention.25 ' The court even considered
evidence of subjective societal perceptions in determining group
distinctness. Clearly, the Akayesu Chamber has significantly
expanded the kinds of groups that will be protected under the
Geneva Convention.
In June 1997, an amended indictment was submitted adding
three more counts of acts of sexual violence that were defined as
"forcible sexual penetration of the vagina, anus, or oral cavity by a
penis and/or the vagina or anus by some other object, and sexual
abuse, such as forced nudity." '252 The Trial Chamber had no
difficulty deciding that Akayesu was guilty of rape as a crime
against humanity.253 The prosecutor had to show that rape and
sexual violence were committed with the specific intent to destroy,
in whole or in part, a particular group---in this case the Tutsi
women-in order to establish rape as genocide.254 Rape and sexual
violence constitute inflictions of "serious bodily and mental
harm," which in part define genocide under Article 2(2) of the
Statute of the ICTR.2" The Trial Chamber was satisfied that the
acts of rape and sexual violence described by witnesses were
perpetrated solely against Tutsi women who were subjected to
humiliation, mutilation, and rape often in public and in the Bureau
Communal where, ironically, they went for refuge.2 ' Because of
the social stigma of rape and the added ethnic taboo of being
violated by a member of the enemy camp, these rapes by Hutus
resulted in the tragic destruction of Tutsi women, their families
249 See id.
250 See id
251 See id
252 Id. § 1.2, 10A.
253 See id § 7.8, 1215.
254 See id. § 7.7, IN 125-50.
255 See ICTR Statute, supra note 22, art. 2(2).
256 See Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, § 7.8, 215.
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and communities. 25' Therefore, sexual violence committed on a
mass scale in Rwanda, as it was in Bosnia, was held to be part of a
251concerted plan to destroy a whole group of defenseless women.
Judge Pillay of South Africa, the only female judge on the
tribunal, served on Trial Chamber I and participated in the
Akayesu judgement.259 She remarked at the end of this grueling
but significant case: "From time immemorial, rape has been
regarded as spoils of war ...now it will be considered a war
crime. We want to send out a strong signal that rape is no longer a
trophy of war.,260
VI. The Shortcomings of the ICTR
The accomplishments of the ICTR far outweigh its
shortcomings. Nevertheless, the ICTR has been besieged by
complaints of corruption and inadequate facilities. Concerns have
been raised that the underdeveloped infrastructure in Arusha,
Tanzania hinders the periodic movement of the Prosecutor from
the Hague Tribunal to the tribunal in Arusha. Additionally, the
ICTR has failed to communicate its accomplishments effectively
to the people of Rwanda. These failures, coupled with terrible
pre-trial detention delays, have undermined the perceived efficacy
of the tribunal.
VII. The Accomplishments of the World Court in Settling
International Disputes
The activity of the World Court, or International Court of
Justice, has increased dramatically since its formation in 1945.26,
The World Court, which is located in the Peace Palace in The
Hague, is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations.262 It
was established pursuant to U.N. Charter Art. 92.263 This court
257 See id.
258 See id.
259 See Bill Berkeley, Judgment Day, WASH. POST, October 11, 1998, at W10.
260 Id.
261 See Susan Tiefenbrun, The Role of the World Court in Settling International
Disputes: A Recent Assessment, 20 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 1 (1997).
262 See id at 5.
263 See id.
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hears disputes only between states. 6 4 In its early years the World
Court was severely criticized for being politically motivated rather
than impartial. 5 Critics called it a weak, even "moribund" forum.
In 1985, the United States announced its general dissatisfaction
with the World Court, withdrawing its declaration accepting the
compulsory jurisdiction of the court.266 Since 1991 the World
Court has increased its activity, especially in its advisory capacity,
however. In contrast to the dismal picture of the World Court in
the 1980s, the 1990s has seen a resurgence of effective adjudication
of mainly territorial disputes.
26 7
Since 1946 the World Court has delivered sixty dispute
judgments concerning land frontiers and maritime boundaries,
territorial sovereignty, the non-use of force, and the non-
interference in the internal affairs of state.26' This last issue is of
importance both to the development of the current crisis and to
requests for U.N. intervention in Kosovo and East Timor. It also
has possible implications for the conflict in Chechnya, should the
strife there continue to escalate.
At least twenty-four cases are pending before the World Court
at the time of this writing, and the General List of cases before the
court has never been longer.269 In April 1999, eight new cases
were added to the General List, all brought by Yugoslavia against
various NATO member states in connection with the NATO air
campaign over Kosovo.27°
For the first time in the history of international law, the World
Court heard a 1996 case involving state-sponsored genocide in
which one nation seeks to enforce against another nation the 1948
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide.271 On April 29, 1996 the newly-formed nation of
264 See id.
265 See id. at 2.
266 See id. at 5.
267 See id. at 3-4.
268 See id.
269 Peter H.F. Bekker, Recent Developments at the World Court, ASIL
NEWSLETTER, July-Aug. 1999, at 1 (visited March 29, 2000)
<http://www.asil.org/newsletter/julaug99/home.htm>.
270 See id. The states named in these new cases included Belgium, Canada, France,
Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and the United Kingdom. See id
271 See William L. Hurlock, The International Court of Justice: Effectively
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Bosnia-Herzegovina brought testimony before the World Court
alleging that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) committed the crime of genocide during the war that
took place in the former Yugoslavia. The International Court of
Justice ruled on July 11, 1996 that it had jurisdiction to decide the
case.27  On July 29, 1996 the World Court ordered Serbia and
Montenegro to answer Bosnia-Herzegovina's allegations of
Genocide Convention violations no later than July 23, 1997.274 The
court's decision will establish the scope and jurisdiction of
international law into the next century, much like the Nuremberg
trials did in 1945.
Nuremberg was a military tribunal accused of doing nothing
more than doling out "victor's justice., 275 In that sense, the ICTY,
the ICTR and the World Court are quite different from the
Nuremberg Tribunal. No nation until now had ever charged
another nation with violating the provisions of the Genocide
Convention.276 The International Court of Justice's assertion of
jurisdiction under Article IX of the Genocide Convention 277
advanced Bosnia-Herzegovina's aim to prove, for the first time in
history, allegations of state-sponsored genocide.
VII. What Will the International Criminal Court
Accomplish in its Aims to Foster and Maintain Peace
Through Justice?
On July 17, 1998, the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of
Providing a Long Overdue Remedy for Ending State-Sponsored Genocide (Bosnia-
Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia) 12 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 299, 300-301 (1997).
272 Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo.), 1996 I.C.J. (Order for
Preliminary Objections), General List No. 91, 1 12-14.
273 See id. [ 47.
274 See Hurlock, supra note 271, at 302.
275 See, e.g., Winston P. Nagan, Strengthening Humanitarian Law: Sovereignty,
International Criminal Law and the Ad Hoc Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 6
DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 127, 151 (1995) (discussing the reputation of military
tribunals generally).
276 See Hurlock, supra note 271, at 307.
277 See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
Dec. 9, 1948, art. IX (visited Apr. 25, 2000) <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/
menu3/b/p.genoci.htm>.
278 See Hurlock, supra note 271, at 328.
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Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of the International
Criminal Court (the Rome Conference) adopted the Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute).27 9 A permanent
International Criminal Court (ICC) will effectively enforce norms
of universal humanitarian law. Further exemplifying the paradox
of our times, the United States has refused to sign the Rome
Statute, even though for years the United States has demonstrated
support for the establishment of a permanent tribunal for the
adjudication of violations of humanitarian law.280
The ICTY and the ICTR have paved the way for the
establishment of the ICC. The Rules of Procedure and Evidence
of both the ICTY and the ICTR can serve as models for the Rules
of Procedure and Evidence that must be drafted for the ICC.
Rigorous requirements for the ICC judges have been established in
the ICC Statute, including expertise in criminal and international
law as well as judicial experience.28' The goal is to select judges
of the highest standards of ethics and impartiality to ensure a fair
and expeditious trial."2 For the judges to effectively manage and
direct the proceedings of the ICC, the current President of the
ICTY encourages that its rules be crafted to achieve flexibility and
to afford sufficient discretion to its judges. 83
The International Criminal Court arguably upsets the balance
between the long-standing principle of sovereignty, which is
firmly implanted in the legal doctrine and political policy of the
United Nations, and the equally valid need to provide international
284humanitarian justice. A permanent international criminal court
279 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.183/9 (July
17, 1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
280 See The Honorable David J. Scheffer, supra note 11, at 1396.
281 See Rome Statute, supra note 279, art. 36.3(b)(i), (ii).
282 See id. art. 36.3(a).
283 See Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, Remarks made by Judge Gabrielle Kirk
McDonald, President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
to the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court at The Hague (July
30, 1999) (visited March 29, 2000) <http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p425-e.htm>.
Judge Kirk McDonald observed, "[a] properly functioning permanent court will be
humanity's best chance yet to move out of its self-destructive cycle. Justice is a
vindication, an historical right, and a deterrent." Id.
284 See Patrica A. McKeon, Comment, An International Criminal Court: Balancing
the Principle of Sovereignty Against the Demands for International Justice, 12 ST.
JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 535, 535-45 (1997).
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would require interference in state sovereignty in order to properly
effectuate extradition, fact finding, and resource gathering. 5
Protests have been lodged against the two ad hoc international
criminal tribunals-the ICTR and the ICTY-for impermissibly
encroaching upon the sovereignty of states. These objections were
overcome because of the temporary nature and situation specific
focus of the tribunals.8 6
As to the enforcement of ICC judgments, most scholars have
tended to divide international crimes into two categories: crimes
perpetrated by states (which can and have been adjudicated in the
World Court), and crimes perpetuated by individuals (non-state
actors). An international criminal court would give the
international community the power to act against crimes of
universal concern committed by individuals. 7
The influence of the two ad hoc tribunals in the establishment
of the ICC is evident on many levels. Like the ICTY and the
ICTR, the ICC will have concurrent jurisdiction over genocide,
war crimes, and crimes against humanity when national courts are
unable or unwilling to prosecute such crimes.2" The Rome Statute
of the ICC recognizes the importance of the ICTY's Tadic
decision announcing that the nexus requirement between crimes
against humanity and international armed conflict, as provided for
in the ICTY Statute, does not reflect contemporary international
law. Therefore, crimes against humanity can be adjudicated in
peacetime pursuant to the Rome Statute of the ICC.2 9 Moreover,
the inclusion of rape and other forms of sexual violence in Article
7(l) of the Rome Statute reflects the imprimatur of the Akayesu
and Tadic cases and represents a marked improvement over the
Nuremberg Charter.
IX. Conclusion
The twentieth century was both the bloodiest and the most
technologically advanced century known to man. 90 Paradoxically,
285 See id. at 561.
286 See id. at 545.
287 See id. at 535.
288 See Rome Statute, supra note 279, arts. 17.1, 17.2.
289 See id arts. 6, 7.
290 See McDonald, supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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we witnessed the establishment of numerous international
tribunals designed to maintain peace, and we saw the systematic
erosion of fundamental human rights and the outbreak of mass
destruction in a recurring pattern of unspeakable humanitarian
emergencies. The recent proliferation of international judicial
bodies29' reflects the need to address the increased hostility in our
international society. The international tribunals have had some
positive effects on efforts to foster and maintain lasting peace with
justice. The Tadic case of the ICTY expanded the definition of
crimes against humanity into non-international conflicts.292
Nevertheless, the Tadic appellate court reversed the Trial
Chamber's decision to apply grave breaches of the Geneva
Convention to an internal conflict. This constitutes a legal setback
in the trend toward humanitarian intervention.2 93 The Tadic court
did, however, expand the definition of rape and included it as a
crime against humanity, a grave breach of the Geneva Convention,
and a war crime.9 The Tadic court also expanded evidentiary
rules for the crime of sexual violence.29' The Erdemovic decision
refined international law on the issue of command responsibility
and the defense of duress and superior orders.296 The shortcomings
of the ICTY are in large part due to the refusal of non-cooperative
states to extradite major perpetrators, which weakens the
tribunal's ability to keep peace.298
291 See Jonathan I. Charney, The Impact on the International Legal System of the
Growth of International Courts and Tribunals, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & PoL. 697, 699
(1999) (concluding that the proliferation of international tribunals does not threaten the
coherence of the international legal system).
292 See Prosecutor v. Tadic, UN Doc. IT-94-1-T, 91 588, 697-8 (ICTY May 7,
1997).
293 See Prosecutor v. Tadic, U.N. Doc. IT-94-1-AR72, U91 77, 80-82 (ICTY Oct. 2,
1995); Meron et al., supra note 206, at 1515.
294 See supra notes 156-98 and accompanying text.
295 See Prosecutor v. Tadic, UN Doc. IT-94-1-T, V 206-223 (ICTY May 7, 1997).
296 See id. 9 588, 697-8 (McDonald, J., and Vohran, J., Joint Separate Opinion).
297 See Statement by Judge Claude Jorda, President of the ICTY (Jan. 27, 2000),
CC/P.I.S./466-E in The United Nations (visited March 29, 2000)
<http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p466-e.htm>. "Of the more than 90 accused, sixty-six
of whom remain indicted, thirty are still at large ... we must . . . insist that all the
accused be arrested." kd
298 Despite the weakening of the peacekeeping aim, the ICTY continues to sentence
war criminals. The ICTY sentenced Goran Jelisic to forty years in prison for theft,
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In looking at the accomplishments of the ICTR, the
Kambanda case established and disseminated an unequivocal
record of genocide committed intentionally and systematically
against the Tutsi people with the aim of exterminating the Tutsi
299
ethnic group. Moreover, the Kambanda case is the first time a
high-level individual was sentenced for personal responsibility in
genocide. In the Akayesu case, rape and sexual violence were
included as crimes which may rise to genocide or crimes againsthumanity."°
The World Court, which is the principle judicial organ of the
United Nations, has increased it activity dramatically since 1981
and has adjudicated a genocide case committed by one sovereign
state against another. This court can only hear cases by one nation
against another and usually handles border disputes.
When the two ad hoc tribunals disappear because they have
causing bodily harm, and murder. See Prosecutor v. Jelisic and Cesic, Case No. IT-95-
10, V 138-39 (1999) (visited Jan. 26, 2000) <http:www.un.org/icty/brcko/
ttialcl/judgment/jel-tj991214e.htm#_Toc473011913>. He was acquitted of genocide, but
found guilty of violations of the laws or customs of war and of crimes against humanity.
See id. The ICTY also recently unanimously found Milan Vujin , prior counsel of Dusko
Tadic, in contempt of the tribunal. See Judgment of Allegations of Contempt Against
Prior Counsel Milan Vujin in Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-AR77 (visited March
29, 2000) <http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appealjudgmentvuj-ajOOO131e.htm>.
299 Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR 97-23-S, In P 39(i)-(xi) (Sept. 4, 1998)
(visited Nov. 18, 1998) <http://www.ictr.org/english/judgements/kambanda.html>.
1o See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, § 7.8, In 157, 215 (Sept. 2,
1998) (visited Nov. 18, 1998) <http://www.ictr.org/english/judgementsakayesu.html>.
The ICTR continues to function on a high level since the Kambanda case was decided.
Georges Anderson Nderubumwe Rutaganda, leader of the Hutu militia, son of a diplomat
and an urban businessman, was found guilty of genocide, crimes against humanity, and
murder. He was sentenced to imprisonment for life on Dec. 6, 1999. See ICTR Press
Release, Rutaganda Convicted of Genocide and Sentenced to Life Imprisonment,
ICTR/INFO9-2-2/6en (Dec. 6, 1999) <http://www.ICTR.org/>. On January 27, 2000 the
ICTR handed down a guilty verdict in the case of Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema, accused
of genocide and crimes against humanity (extermination and rape). He was sentenced to
life imprisonment. See Kingsley Chieder Moghalu, Spokesman for the ICTR, briefing to
the media (Jan. 27, 2000) on International Criminal Tribunalfor Rwanda (visited March
29, 2000) <http://www.ICTR.org/>. The ICTR has convicted 7 persons in total. The
Appeals Chamber of the ICTR is scheduled to hear three cases from Feb. 12-17, 2000,
including the Serushago case, the Semanza case, and the Barayagwiza case. See id. The
United States Supreme Court denied a Petition for Writ of Certiorari by Elizaphan
Ntakirutimana who was indicted by the ICTR but has been living in Texas since 1996.
The U.S. Secretary of State is expected to surrender Ntakirutimana to the ICTR to face
trial. See id. The ICTR is pleased at these positive developments and the cooperation of
neighboring countries with the extradition of suspects. See id.
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successfully adjudicated the serious violations of international
humanitarian law in the territories of the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda, their roles will be taken up by the International Criminal
Court. The ICC will have concurrent jurisdiction with national
courts and jurisdiction over individuals. Note that the United
States has refused to sign the Rome Statute establishing the ICC,
even though for many years it has been an active proponent of
such a permanent international tribunal.
The paradox of our century is mirrored in the development of
international adjudication. On the one hand the world is shocked
by the proliferation of criminal atrocities in our global society. On
the other hand, the world can boast of a dazzling array of newly-
established international judicial bodies, all of which are designed
to provide speedy and impartial adjudication of these unspeakable
crimes. We speak of peace and offer only punishment as a means
to achieve that peace. We tout the virtues of justice, and we live in
a culture of impunity. Instead of rehabilitating the criminal mind,
we seek retribution and revenge.
But the madness of this century is not the madness that once
was-a quest for power and turf. Now is the era of hate and fear
of the other. The roots of this hatred spring from systematic
victimization, subtle forms of disrespect, and blatant forms of
discrimination designed to destroy all sense of self-worth. The
international judicial system can and does play a role in the re-
education of our hate-filled society, but it must play a more
important role in teaching new values and in fostering respect for
the rights of others.
The courts are beginning to integrate other disciplines into the
legal process by harnessing the knowledge and expertise of
professionals in diverse fields of social service. This multi-
disciplinary approach to the law should be continued and
expanded to create an integrated system. A more integrated
system of international adjudication would reinforce respect for
human dignity that underlies respect for the rule of law worldwide.
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